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The political economy of development assistance: peril to government quality 
dynamics in Africa
Abstract
 This paper assesses the effectiveness of foreign aid in improving government institutions 
in 52 African countries using updated data(1996-2010). Findings suggest development assistance 
deteriorates government quality dynamics of corruption-control, political-stability, rule of law, 
regulation  quality,  voice  and  accountability  and  government  effectiveness.  It  is  therefore  a 
momentous epoque to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; high time economists and policy 
makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, 
it is up to people who really care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for results.  
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55
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1.  Introduction
For over five decades the political economy of foreign aid has been widely debated in 
academic and policy-making circles. A large literature on institutions and development suggests 
that Africa is poor because it has poor institutions: dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak 
courts  and  contract  enforcement,  high  corruption,  political  instability,  violence  and  hostile 
regulatory environment  for private business. According to this view, in order to end African 
poverty, the West needs to promote good institutions. In 2005 the West tried hardest to salvage 
Africa. In July of that year, the G8 agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion a year 
to $50 billion to finance the ‘Big push’, as well as scrap African aid loans contracted during 
previous attempts at a ‘Big push’. Prior to  this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive 
continent in the world. In September of that same year, world leaders met at the United Nations 
to further discuss progress on ending poverty in Africa. To point out some alarming statistics, 
sub-Saharan  Africa  makes-up 11% of  the  world’s  population,  but  produces  only  1% of  the 
worlds GDP(Easterly,2005a). In the median African nation, 43% of the population survive on 
less than one dollar a day. On the World Food Program list, of the twenty-three countries with 
more than 35% of the population malnourished, seventeen are in Africa. The long and brutal 
civil  wars  in  Angola,  Chad,  Somalia,  Sierra  Leon,  Liberia…etc,  not  to  mention  Rwanda’s 
genocide  and  recent  carnages  in  Darfur-Sudan  and  the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo 
(registering the world’s highest war casualties since World War Two). In fact, seven of the 8 
recent cases of total societal breakdown into anarchy in the world known to literature have been 
in  Africa:  Angola,  Burundi,  Liberia,  Sudan,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia  and  Zaire/Congo(beside 
Afghanistan).
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In assessing the impact of development assistance, a great bulk of studies have focused 
on the effect of aid flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables(investment or 
public consumption). The underlying assumption here is that aid is destined to bridge the saving-
investment  gap  poor  countries  face(Rostow,1960;  Chenery  & Strout,1966;  Easterly,  2005a). 
Surprisingly there has been much less research conducted on the impact of foreign aid on the 
evolution of government institutions. More so, a great bulk of research on the African aid-growth 
nexus has been premised on data collected before the year 2000 with less emphasis placed on the 
role development assistance play in good governance trends. The contribution of this paper to the 
literature is threefold.  Firstly,  we cut adrift  the mainstream approach to the aid-development 
nexus by assessing government quality effects of development assistance. Secondly, a great bulk 
of literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 1995. Thus by using recent data(1996-
2010), this paper provides an updated account of governance trends in the nexus. Thirdly, the 
focus on 52 of the 54 African countries provides broad and inclusive  views on the continent 
where the aid-development debate is most tensed.  The remainder of this paper is presented as 
follows. Section 2 thoroughly examines existing literature on the aid-development nexus. Data 
and  methodology  are  respectively   presented  and outlined  in  Section  3.  Empirical  analysis, 
corresponding discussion, policy implications and limitations are covered in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Literature review
2.1 Conflicts in the  literature 
The literature on the effectiveness of aid has almost exclusively been oriented towards 
the macroeconomic impacts of aid; assessing the effects of aid on economic savings, investment 
and growth. The low-depth of analytical framework, heavy reliance on empirical evidence(which 
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is often ambiguous at best) and inconclusive  results with recently refined methodologies(Masud 
& Yontcheva,2005), leaves the subject matter widely open to debate. For the purpose of clarity, 
literature pertaining to the effectiveness of aid on growth(development) could be classified into 
two strands as summarized in Table 1: one acknowledging the negative consequences of aid and 
the other advocating the positive rewards of development assistance. 
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature
 Researchers Main findings 
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth(development)
Mosley et al. (1992) Aid increases unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth.
Reichel(1995) Aid fails to promote savings owing to the substitution effect.
Ghura(1995) Aid negatively impacts savings.
Boone(1996) Aid  is  insignificant  in  improving  economic  development  for  two  reasons: 
poverty is not caused by capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to 
adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows.
Pedersen (1996) Foreign Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency.
Second-strand : Aid improves growth(development)
Burnside & Dollar(2000) Aid can be effective when policies and economic management are good.
Ghura(1995) Aid positively impacts savings for good adjusters.
Guillaumont &  Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors(shocks and hazards)
Collier & Dehn(2001) Aid effectiveness  depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 
of negative supply shocks is better than ‘targeting’ based on good policies. 
Collier & Dollar(2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per-capita
income growth; and impact of per-capita income growth on poverty
reduction.
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly
in line with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human
well-being. 
Gomanee et al.(2003) Aid  has  either  a  direct  effect  on  welfare  and  indirect  effect  through  public 
spending on social services. 
Clement et al. (2004) Aid has a short-term positive impact on growth
Ishfaq (2004) Foreign Aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the
extent of poverty in Pakistan.
Mosley et al. (2004) Foreign assistance has an indirect impact on poverty and the well-being of
recipient countries.
Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. 
Aid broadly works to  mitigate  poverty,  and  poverty would be higher  in  the 
absence of aid.
Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes. 
Source(Author)
The first strand includes  authors presenting the case for the insignificant impact of aid on 
investment,  savings  or  growth.  Aid  has  been  shown  to  improve  unproductive  public 
consumption(Mosley et al.,1992) and stops short of  increasing investment. This later point has 
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been confirmed  by Boone(1996) and Reichel(1995).  Ghura(1995) has pointed to the negative 
effect of aid on domestic savings while Pedersen (1996) asserts, foreign aid distorts development 
and leads to aid dependency. 
In the second strand, we find studies in favor of the positive effects of aid on growth and 
development. Among these works, we shall highlight that of   Burnside & Dollar(2000) who 
conclude on the effectiveness of aid when policies are good. The Burnside & Dollar(2000) paper 
has  received  abundant  comments  from researchers(Guillaumont  & Chauvet,  2001;  Colier  & 
Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003); comments which have been challenged as being “extremely 
data dependent”(Clemens et al.,2004). 
2.2 Africa’s needs and Western responses 
The  bulk  of  African  countries  lie  quite  low  on  standard  international  comparisons. 
According to  Easterly(2005a),  they occupy most  of the bottom places  in  income per  capita, 
percentage  of  population  living  in  extreme  poverty(less  than  one  US  dollar  a  day),  life 
expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, AIDS prevalence and the HDI. The last four decades have 
been those of extreme growth dismay in Africa. The West has reacted to Africa’s tragedy with 
intensive  involvement  of  foreign  aid  agencies  and  international  organizations.  On  average 
African countries receive much more aid in terms of percentage GDP than other developing 
countries. The West does more because Africa is poor, however its efforts are supposed to have 
positive impacts on GDP and development. 
The year 2005 was that during which the West pressed hardest to save Africa. In July of 
that year, the G8 agreed to double foreign aid to Africa from $25 billion a year to $50 billion to 
finance the ‘Big push’, as well as erase African aid loans contracted during previous attempts at 
a ‘Big push’. Before this effort, Africa was already the most aid-intensive region on the planet.  
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In September of that same year, world leaders gathered at the United Nations to further discuss 
progress on ending poverty in the continent. 
 2.3 Theories and effects of Western assistance on Africa
2.3.1 The Big-Push models and foreign aid
In line with  Easterly(2005a), “Big-Push” models suggest that Africa is poor because it is 
stuck in a “poverty trap”. To emerge from the poverty trap, the continent need’s a large aid-
financed increase in investment; a “Big Push”. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth 
models have been used to discuss the mechanisms of the poverty trap. The first mechanism is 
that, savings are quite low for people who are very close to subsistence(as outlined by a Stone-
Geary utility function). In a closed economy, saving and investment are equal, thus investment is 
low. In the Harrod-Domar model with the capital constraint binding, per capita growth in GDP is 
simply a linear function of the investment(=saving) rate minus the population and depreciation 
rates. If the saving is quite low to compensate for population growth and the depreciation of 
capita,  then per  capita  growth in  GDP will  zero or negative.  In the 1950s and 1960s,  early 
development  economists  postulated  a  desirable  per  capita  growth  rate  and  calculated  the 
“investment requirement” to meet this target: the margin between the low domestic saving rate 
and the “investment requirement” was termed the “Financing Gap”. The purpose of aid was to 
cover  the Financing Gap(Rostow,1960;  Chenery & Strout,1966).  Thus this  model  foresaw a 
strong growth effect for foreign aid through its role in boosting domestic investment above what 
domestic savings would finance. Although this model soon went out of favor in the academic 
literature on development, it remained somehow relevant in international organizations like the 
World Bank. Current policy proponents promoting foreign aid to Africa have explicitly cited this 
model(Devarajan  et  al.,  2002 at  the  World Bank;  Blair  Commission  on Africa,2005;  Sachs, 
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2005).  Sach(2005)  posits:  “success  in  ending  the  poverty  trap  will  be  much  easier  than  it  
appears”. He asserts that the increase in foreign aid and debt relief can end Africa’s poverty in 
our generation. In a closed economy, saving depends not only on the margin from subsistence 
but also on the incentive to save depending on the rate of return to saving and investment. In an 
open  economy  for  instance,  investment  is  not  only  a  function  of  domestic  saving  but  also 
depends on the rate of return to investment. As shown by Africa’s extensive capital flight in 
which  an  estimated  39%  of   African  capital  stock  is  held  outside  the  continent(Collier  et 
al.,2001),  domestic  investors compare the returns to domestic  and foreign investments:  since 
private  foreign  investors  and  bank  lenders  will  invest  in  the  economy  if  returns  are  very 
attractive. In the Solow model, a strong relationship  between income and savings rates could 
generate  multiple  equilibria  at  low  and  high  benchmarks  of  capital  stock,  resurfacing  the 
possibility of a poverty trap. Again, the low domestic savings do not pose much of an issue in an 
open  economy in  which  investment  responds  to  incentives.   Kraay & Raddatz(2005)   have 
shown that the relationship between initial capital and savings must follow an S-shaped curve to 
generate a poverty trap; however they stop short of  finding  evidence for this shape in the data. 
The  second  poverty  generating  mechanism  is  some  kind  of  nonconvexity  of  the 
production function in the Solow model. There could be strong external economies to investment 
or there maybe  high fixed costs to investment projects such that a minimum benchmark must be 
surpassed for  investment  to  be productive.  This  notion inspired the original  article  that  first 
proposed  a  Big  Push(Rosentein-Rodan,1943).  This  strand  has  had  a  longer  shelf-life  in  the 
academic literature than the “Financing Gap” model(mechanism) because of the great zeal of 
theorists  in  models  with  multiple  equilibira(  Murphy  et  al.,  1989).  In  emphasizing  such 
nonconvexities, Sach(2005) posits  that Africa is in a poverty trap. ‘Big Push’ models foretell 
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strong impacts of aid on investment and growth(development). This prediction has been subject 
to a vast empirical literature which this paper has already highlighted and summarized above(see 
Section 2.1 and Table 1). 
2.3.2 Project interventions: education and health
Another view of Africa’s poverty has been that, it results from low human capital(poor 
health and education) and infrastructure. This emphasis which began in the 1960s is still a  major 
theme in explaining Africa’s poverty. While enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality of 
education  is  hampered  by  missing  inputs  like  textbooks  and  other  school  material,  weak 
incentives for teachers,  corruption in education bureaucracies and disruption of schooling by 
political  crisis(Filmer & Pritchett,  1997).  In health, some of the initial  progress has slowed, 
possibly  due  to  corruption  in  the  health  system(  studies  in  Cameroon,  Guinea,  Uganda and 
Tanzania estimated that 30 to 70% of government drugs disappeared before reaching patients) 
and more  complicated health  problems cannot  be solved with routine methods(Filmer et  al., 
2000; Pritchett & Woolcock,2004). 
2.3.3 Models of policies and growth
The structural  adjustment  programs emerged from another  perspective  of  why Africa 
remains poor and this gained prominence in the early 1980s with the advent of the “Washington 
consensus” and the pro-free markets arguments of people like the World Bank chief economist 
Anne Krueger. According to this thesis, Africa is poor because its governments have chosen bad 
policies. Indeed, it is obvious that many African governments pursued policies very detrimental 
to  growth  and  economic  development:  artificially  overvalued  currencies,  high  black  market 
premiums on foreign exchange, controls on interest rates that led to negative real interest rates 
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for savers, drastic(radical) restrictions on international trade and reliance on state enterprise. The 
“bad policies” view of Africa’s poverty led to a different  perception of the role of aid. The role 
of Western donors and international institutions in this view was to induce changes in policy in 
Africa by making aid contingent on such changes. Structural adjustment loans of the IMF and 
the World Bank were thus embodied in this framework: which had as goal an “adjustment with 
growth”.  How successful were these loans in facilitating macroeconomic “adjustment”, that is to 
say:  changing  policy?  How  successful  was  development  assistance  in  inducing  appealing 
policies? The answer appears to be that Western donors and international institutions have not 
been very successful in changing policy(Alesina & Dollar, 2002; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Van 
de Walle, 2001; Easterly,2005b). However these studies are premised on old data. Perhaps  using 
much recent data(as this paper aims)could provide different trends. 
2.3.4 Dysfunctional donors 
Concurring with Westerly(2005a), while all the attention in the ‘aid and development’ 
debate  is  focused  on  Africa,  it  is  also  interesting  to  assess  how  effective  donors  were  in 
delivering valuable services to the continent.  There have been uncomfortable  signs of donor 
dysfunction. A case in point is the over 2 billion US dollars spent on roads in Tanzania over the 
last  20  years.  Yet  roads  did  not  improve.  Even  by  bureaucratic  standards,  foreign  aid 
bureaucracy  is  dire.  Why?  Perhaps  it  is  because  efforts  and  results  in  aid  are  largely 
unobservable and noticed only by the voiceless and powerless poor. Thus, the lack of visibility 
on  feed-backs  and  results  makes  aid  bureaucracies  unaccountable.  Unlike  democratic 
governments or  private firms in wealthy countries, aid agencies do not face a “voter test” or “ a 
market test”. Africa’s poor could be conceived as political orphans; with no voice or feedback on 
if aid is helping and nobody accountable to them.
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2.4  Aids, institutions and development 
An extensive  literature  on  institutions  and  development  suggests  that  Africa  is  poor 
because it has poor institutions: dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak courts and contract 
enforcement,  violence  and  political  instability,  hostile  regulatory  environment  for  private 
business and high inflation. In a bid to end African poverty, according to this perspective the 
West needs to promote good institutions. Svensson(2000) finds that aid increases corruption in 
ethnically fractionalized states (which  is the situation of most African countries). The findings 
of Knack(2001) suggest that higher aid worsens bureaucratic quality, leads to violating the law 
with great impunity and more corruption(controlling for potential reverse causality). Similarly, 
Djankov et al.(2005) notice that high aid caused setbacks to democracy between 1960 and 1999. 
Indeed they found aid’s effect on democracy to be worse than that of the ‘natural resource curse’. 
From the interesting literature on aid and institutions, in examining whether donors can 
still influence institutions at the margin, three questions have received some attention. First, do 
donors  give  more  to  poor  countries  who  have  better  institutions(e.g  less  corruption,  more 
democracy)? Second, does aid induce better or worse institutional quality? Third, how would 
outsiders  engineer  a  transition  from the  present  state  of  informal  institutions  towards  more 
formal institutional settings? The first question is relevant because donors widely assumed that 
aid would be more effective  in countries with better institutions. The answer to the first concern 
also affects the response to the second. Thus, if donors give more aid to countries with better 
institutions,  this  would create  some incentive for reformers  in the recipient  country to adapt 
better institutions.  Alesina & Dollar(2000) and Alesina & Weder(2002) find no evidence that 
democracies or less corrupt states are rewarded with more aid. The focus of this paper is the 
second question. Then there is the thorny third issue about how aid would practically go about 
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changing institutions in the interest of Africa. The transition from informal to formal institutions 
is  somehow  complex.  Attempts  by  Western  aid  agencies  to  introduce  top-down  formal 
institutions have not fared well in the complicated maze of bottom-up arrangements. Dixit(2004) 
has  an  interesting  argument  as  to  how  introducing  imperfect  rule-based  institutions  could 
actually make things worse, as they create outside opportunities for members of relationship-
based networks. Network members can then cheat on their partners and exit to operate in the 
rule-based system. A society could get caught in-between formal and informal institutions with 
neither working well.  Before closing this section, it is worthwhile noting that this part of the 
literature  has  guided our choice of the government  quality determinants  we shall  use in  the 
analytical phase of this paper. These include: control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability(no violence), voice and accountability, rule of law and regulation quality. 
2.5 The scope of the current paper
In line with  Clement et al.(2004), aggregate aid  could be divided into three categories: 
(1) emergency and humanitarian aid(likely to be negatively correlated with growth); (2) aid that 
affects  growth  only  over  the  long-term(if  at  all),  such  as  aid  to  support  democracy,  the 
environment, health or education; and (3) aid that plausibly could stimulate growth in the long 
term, including budget and balance of payments support, investments in infrastructure and aid 
for  productive  sectors  such  as  agricultural  and  industrial.  Whereas  aid  effectiveness  papers 
implicitly define donors’ objective as solely the promotion of economic growth or the reduction 
of poverty in the recipient countries, a parallel strand of literature on aid allocation has shown 
that most donors often pursue a different underlying agenda by allocating aid according to their 
own strategic interest. Masud & Yontcheva(2005) have underlined that if a significant part of aid 
is allocated for strategic purposes, no positive impact in terms of growth or poverty alleviation 
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should be expected. We partially negate this claim by asserting that, foreign aid irrespective of 
vested  interest  should  contribute  to  institutional  development(degradation)  either  directly  or 
indirectly. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is threefold. Firstly, a great chunk of the 
literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 1995. By using recent data(1996-2010), 
this paper provides an updated account on the trends in the nexus. Secondly, we focus mainly on 
Africa  where  the  aid-institutions  debate  is  most  tensed.  While  previous  studies  have  mixed 
countries in various continental  regions  or focused on a restricted set of countries owing to 
constraints in data availability, this paper uses data on 52 African countries. Thirdly, the African 
geopolitical  landscape has been recently marked by a wave of revolutions and social-unrests 
owing  to  popular  demands  for  institutional  changes(Jasmine  revolution  and  its  contagion). 
Findings from this paper could be relevant in providing policy recommendations as to if foreign-
aid could influence government quality in aid-recipient countries. 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We investigate  a panel  of 52 African countries with data  from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) ranging from 1996 to 2010. Corresponding variables 
and  countries  are  presented  in  the  appendices  (Appendix  3  and  Appendix  4  respectively). 
Borrowing from the IMF (2005) definition and the literature in Section 2.4, government quality 
dependent  variables  include:  corruption-control,  government-effectiveness,  voice  and 
accountability,  political  stability  or  no  violence,  rule  of  law  and  regulation  quality.  The 
independent variable is Net Official Development Assistance(NODA). For robustness purposes 
we  use  total  NODA,  NODA  from  multilateral  donors  and  NODA  from  the  Development 
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Assistance Committee(DAC) countries.   Instrumental variables are: legal-origins, income-levels 
and  religious-dominations.  These  instruments  have  been  substantially  documented  in  the 
economic development literature (La Porta et al., 1997; Beck et al., 2003; Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 
2011ab). In the regressions we control for openness(trade) and population growth at the first-
stage and only for democracy and public investment at the second-stage. The choice of control 
variables is also contingent on the degrees of freedom necessary for overidentifying restrictions 
tests at second-stage regressions(more than two control variables will result in exact or under-
identification; meaning instruments are either equal to or less than the number of endogenous 
explaining variables respectively). Summary statistics and correlation analysis are also presented 
in the appendices(Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively). While the former indicates that the 
distributions of the variables are comparable, the later guides the empirical analysis in avoiding 
issues related to multicolinearity and overparametization. 
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity 
While  development  assistance  has  a  bearing  on  the  development  of  the  recipient 
country(Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al.,2006), the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out as aid 
from donor agencies(countries) is contingent on institutional  and  developmental characteristics. 
Such  factors  maybe  environmental(Guillaumont  &  Chauvet,  2001),  supply-shocks(Collier  & 
Dehn, 2001) or even effective policies and economic management standards(Burnside & Dollar, 
2000). We are thus faced with a concern of endogeneity owing to reverse-causality and omitted 
variables, as the NODA indicators are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. 
To address this concern we shall assess the presence of endogeneity with the Hausman-test and 
hence employ an estimation technique that takes account of the endogeneity issue.
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3.2.2 Estimation technique 
Concurring  with  Beck  et  al.(2003)  and  recent  African  law-finance  literature(Asongu, 
2011cd) the paper adopts an Instrumental  Variable(IV) estimation method.  Estimation by IV 
addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients 
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error 
term in the main equation. In line with Asongu (2011cde), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) 
estimation method adopted by this work  will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigiNODA )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ  υα ++ itiX      (1)            
                                                                                                
Second-stage regression:
++= itit NODAtQualityGov )(' 10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                                                    (2) 
In the two equations,  X represents the set of  control variables. For the first and second 
equations, respectively  v  and u, denote the disturbance terms. Instrumental variables include 
legal-origins, dominant-religions and income-levels. NODA stands for Net Official Development 
Assistance: the foreign aid indicator.  
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
- firstly, justify the choice of a TSLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test 
for endogeneity;
- secondly, show the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining 
variables (aid channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-  lastly,  ensure the instruments  are  valid  and not correlated  with the error-term in the main 
equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.
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3.2.3 Robustness checks  
To ensure robustness of the analysis, the following checks will be carried out: (1) usage 
of alternative indicators of Government Quality(GQ) dynamics; (2) employment of two distinct 
interchangeable sets of moment conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) 
usage of alternative aid indicators; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity; (5) estimation 
with robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent(HAC) standard errors.  
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section addresses the ability of the exogenous components of NODA dynamics to 
account for differences in GQ dynamics; the ability of the instruments to explain variations in the 
endogenous components of NODA dynamics and the possibility of the instruments to account 
for GQ dynamics beyond NODA dynamic channels. To make these examinations we use the 
panel TSLS-IV estimation method with legal-origins, income-levels, and religious-dominations 
as instrumental variables.
4.1 Development assistance and instruments 
Table 2 below investigates the validity of the instruments in explaining cross-country 
differences in NODA dynamics. Clearly, it could be noticed that distinguishing African countries 
by legal-origins, income levels and religious-dominations help explain cross-country differences 
in NODA. Based on the Fisher-test, the instruments taken collectively enter significantly in all 
regressions at the 1% significance level.  Broadly the following conclusions could be established. 
(1) Christian-dominant  countries have benefited more or less in foreign-aid than their  Islam-
oriented counterparts  depending on the NODA dynamic.  (2) In line with common sense and 
economic  theory,  Low-income  countries  receive  more  aid  than  Middle-income  countries. 
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Control variables estimates are significant with the right signs as development aid increases with 
population growth and economic openness(due to the export substitution effect).
Table 2: First-stage regressions
Net Official Development Assistance(NODA)
NODAgdp NODAMDgdp NODADACgdp
1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 1st Set 2nd Set 
Instruments 
Constant 5.927*** -3.094* 2.008*** -2.592*** 3.907*** -0.383
(3.842) (-1.806) (3.030) (-3.522) (3.803) (-0.336)
English  0.174 --- 0.513 --- -0.347 ---
(0.210) (1.440) (-0.630)
French --- -0.174 --- -0.513 --- 0.347
(-0.210) (-1.440) (0.630)
Christianity 0.155 --- -0.789** --- 0.995* ---
(0.179) (-2.120) (1.723)
Islam --- -0.155 --- 0.789** --- -0.995*
(-0.179) (2.120) (-1.723)
L.Income --- 9.351*** --- 4.324*** --- 4.937***
(9.195) (9.896) (7.291)
M. Income -13.048*** --- -5.540*** --- -7.410*** ---
(-10.99) (-10.86) (-9.372)
LMIncome 3.696*** --- 1.216** --- 2.472*** ---
(2.973) (2.277) (2.986)
UMIncome --- -3.696*** --- -1.216*** --- -2.472***
(-2.973) (-2.277) (-2.986)
Control 
Variables 
Popg 2.439*** 2.439*** 1.287*** 1.287*** 1.128*** 1.128***
(5.912) (5.912) (7.263)) (7.263) (4.108) (4.108)
Trade 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.016**
(3.471) (3.471) (4.208) (4.208) (2.346) (2.346)
Adjusted R² 0.294 0.294 0.321 0.321 0.216 0.216
Fisher Statistics 47.342*** 47.342*** 53.563*** 53.563*** 31.774*** 31.774***
Observations 668 668 668 668 668 668
L:  Low.  LM:  Lower  Middle.  UM:  Upper  Middle.  Ivt:  Investment.  Pop:  population.  *;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1% 
respectively. NODAgdp: NODA on GDP.  NODAMDgdp: NODA from Multilateral Donors on GDP.  NODADACgdp: NODA  from DAC  
countries on GDP.  Student statistics ratios in brackets. 1st Set: First  Set of Instruments . 2nd Set: Second Set of Instruments.
4.2 Development assistance  and quality of government  
Table 3 investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of NODA channels to account for 
GQ  dynamics  and (2) the possibility of the instrumental  variables explaining GQ dynamics 
beyond NODA channels.  Whereas we probe into the first issue by assessing the significance of 
estimated coefficients, the second is assessed with the Cragg-Donald and Sargan-OIR tests. 
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The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the view that the instruments account for GQ dynamics 
only through NODA channels. Thus  a rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection of the 
view that  the  instruments  explain  GQ dynamics  through  no other  mechanisms  than  NODA 
channels. The null hypothesis of Cragg-Donald test is the position that the instruments are weak; 
thus  its  rejection  points  to  the  strength  of  the  instruments  at  first-stage  regressions.  The 
Hausman-test  for  endogeneity  precedes  every  IV  regression  and  justifies  the  choice  of  the 
estimation technique. The null hypothesis of this test is the view that OLS estimates are efficient 
and consistent. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the issue of reverse causality 
(endogeneity)  we have emphasized   above (see Section 3.2.1) and hence lends credit  to the 
TSLS-IV estimation technique. Otherwise OLS is used in the modeling exercise. For robustness 
checks, results are replicated using an alternative set of instrumental variables, as depicted in the 
second and third to the last lines of Table 3. In modeling the unrestricted regressions presented in 
Table 3, the null hypothesis of the Hausman-test is rejected for all the regressions; confirming 
the presence of endogeneity and hence the choice of the TSLS-IV approach.
With  regard  to  the  first  concern  which  is  addressed by the  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients,  it  can  be  firmly  established  that  NODA  dynamics  significantly  decrease  GQ 
dynamics  in Africa. It follows that development assistance destined to the African continent, 
decreases  the  control  of  corruption,  government  effectiveness,  political  stability,  voice  and 
accountability, regulation quality and the rule of law. These results are broadly consistent with 
the  aid-development  literature  where-in  development  assistance:  increases  corruption  in 
ethnically  fractionalized  countries(Svensson,  2000);  worsens  bureaucratic  quality,  leads  to 
violation  of   the  law  with  greater  impunity  and  more  corruption(Knack,  2001)  and  causes 
setbacks to democracy(Djankov et al.,2005). 
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Table 3: Second-stage regressions without HAC standard errors 
Control  of Corruption Government Effectiveness Political Stability
Constant -0.631*** -0.649*** -0.621*** 0.198 -0.155 -0.066 -1.080*** -1.089*** -1.093***
(-9.100) (-9.674) (-8.519) (0.376) (-0.487) (-0.191) (-2.661) (-2.704) (-2.629)
NODAgdp -0.023*** --- --- -0.050*** --- --- -0.026*** --- ---
(-6.010) (-5.904) (-3.938)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.053*** --- --- -0.087*** --- --- -0.062*** ---
(-6.006) (-6.419) (-3.979)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.041*** --- --- -0.068*** --- --- -0.046***
(-5.781) (-6.131) (-3.778)
Democracy 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.116*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.171***
(5.752) (5.892) (5.475) (4.672) (5.766) (4.834) (6.653) (6.907) (6.377)
Public Investment --- --- --- --- -0.068* -0.070* 0.040 0.038 0.043
(-1.766) (-1.686) (0.838) (0.795) (0.880)
Hausman-test 49.346*** 50.302*** 49.910*** 103.89*** 104.11*** 120.05*** 26.843*** 26.922*** 29.052***
OIR-Sargan test 0.039 0.695 0.214 1.603 2.143 0.000 0.199 0.003 0.709
P-value [0.980] [0.706] [0.898] [0.205] [0.143] [0.983] [0.654] [0.950] [0.399]
Cragg-Donald 19.796 19.854 19.641 2.341 4.356 4.389 3.579 3.530 3.616
Adjusted R² 0.177 0.172 0.167 0.102 0.205 0.186 0.325 0.324 0.314
Fisher Statistics 34.280*** 34.523*** 31.793*** 21.992*** 32.020*** 28.389*** 27.534*** 27.823*** 26.081***
Observations 514 514 514 399 443 443 452 452 452
Regulation Quality Rule of Law Voice and Accountability
Constant -0.204 -0.259 -0.180 -0.357 -0.415 -0.334 -0.693** -0.686** -0.706*
(-0.603) (-0.777) (-0.510) (-0.993) (-1.160) (-0.896) (-2.479) (-2.466) (-2.515)
NODAgdp -0.030*** --- --- -0.033*** --- --- -0.008* --- ---
(-5.371) (-5.575) (-1.876)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.068*** --- --- -0.074 --- --- -0.021** ---
(-5.221) (-5.332) (-1.968)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.054*** --- --- -0.060*** --- --- -0.014*
(-5.263) (-5.512) (-1.772)
Democracy 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.146*** 0.135*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.198***
(5.337) (5.712) (4.932) (6.038) (6.399) (5.612) (11.08) (11.26) (10.94)
Public Investment -0.053 -0.052 -0.053 -0.049 -0.048 -0.048 -0.057* -0.058* -0.055*
(-1.323) (-1.301) (-1.267) (-1.137) (-1.115) (-1.080) (-1.704) (-1.746) (-1.657)
Hausman-test 48.153*** 44.185*** 54.739*** 81.226*** 79.312*** 89.942*** 46.888*** 44.846*** 42.808***
OIR-Sargan test 1.890 4.163** 0.612 2.559 5.310** 0.929 0.685 0.338 1.038
P-value [0.169] [0.041] [0.433] [0.109] [0.021] [0.335] [0.407] [0.560] [0.308]
Cragg-Donald 3.568 3.528 3.598 3.579 3.530 3.616 3.579 3.530 3.616
Adjusted R² 0.206 0.208 0.191 0.217 0.209 0.211 0.564 0.565 0.562
Fisher Statistics 26.947*** 26.797*** 25.203*** 31.687*** 30.848*** 29.982*** 52.851*** 53.084*** 52.360***
Observations 450 450 450 452 452 452 452 452 452
First-Set of Instruments Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1%  respectively.  ():  z-statistics  .  []:  p-values  corresponding  to  OIR-Sargan  test.   OIR:  
Overidentifying Restrictions test.  NODAgdp:  NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp:NODA from Multilateral Donors  on GDP.  NODADACgdp: 
NODA  from DAC  countries on GDP.  For the Cragg-Donald statistics the  relative  bias is probably less than 5% since the  critical value for  
TSLS bias over OLS is 0.00 (11.04) when four(three) endogenous variables are used.   
As to what concerns the second-issue, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the OIR test 
in all regressions signifies that the instruments do not explain GQ dynamics through some other 
mechanisms beyond NODA channels. Thus the instruments are valid and not correlated with the 
disturbance term in the main equation; the instruments do not suffer-from endogeneity. We also 
report the Cragg-Donald statistics for the strength of the instruments at the first stage of the 
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TSLS.  The  alternative  hypothesis  for  strong  instrument  is  not  rejected  in  all  regressions, 
confirming the strength of the instruments. The control variables are significant with the right 
signs since:  democratic institutions improve government quality and public investment is often 
associated with poor management and corrupt practices in allocation of contracts. According to 
Ndikumana & Baliamoune-Lutz(2008), the positive association between public investment and 
corruption supports the view that corrupt bureaucrats aim to increase capital expenditures(over 
maintenance expenditure) to maximize private gains(rents-seeking).   The analysis in Table 3 is 
replicated with the second-set of moment conditions to confirm robustness of results.
4.3 Development assistance  and quality of government(with HAC standard errors)
Table 4 below presents  HAC-TSLS results. On a first note, results of the Hausman-test 
confirm the choice of our estimation approach. The Sargan-OIR test statistics also confirm  the 
validity of the instruments in all regressions. Broadly findings based on HAC-TSLS regressions 
confirm  those  in  Table  3;  even  after   the  analysis  is  replicated  with  an  alternative  set  of 
instruments. In substance both the NODA regressors and control variables are significant with 
the right signs. 
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Table 4: Second-stage regressions with HAC standard errors 
Control  of Corruption Government Effectiveness Political Stability
Constant -0.631*** -0.649*** -0.621*** -0.094 -0.155 -0.066 -1.080 -1.089 -1.093
(-3.492) (-3.580) (-3.451) (-0.151) (-0.246) (-0.107) (-0.882) (-0.882) (-0.899)
NODAgdp -0.023** --- --- -0.038*** --- --- -0.026 --- ---
(-2.454) (-3.071) (-1.632)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.053** --- --- -0.087*** --- --- -0.062 ---
(-2.384) (-3.030) (-1.639)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.041** --- --- -0.068*** --- --- -0.046
(-2.474) (-3.010) (-1.580)
Democracy 0.105** 0.107** 0.104** 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.171***
(2.368) (2.377) (2.347) (2.957) (3.021) (2.907) (3.020) (3.028) (3.016)
Public Investment --- --- --- -0.070 -0.068 -0.070 0.040 0.038 0.043
(-0.936) (-0.887) (-0.955) (0.269) (0.251) (0.292)
Hausman-test 49.346*** 50.302*** 49.910*** 109.52*** 104.11*** 120.05*** 26.843*** 26.922*** 29.052***
OIR-Sargan test 0.039 0.695 0.214 0.425 2.143 0.000 0.199 0.003 0.709
P-value [0.980] [0.706] [0.898] [0.514] [0.143] [0.983] [0.654] [0.950] [0.399]
Cragg-Donald --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Adjusted R² 0.177 0.172 0.167 0.204 0.205 0.186 0.325 0.324 0.314
Fisher Statistics 6.416*** 6.315*** 6.400*** 8.675*** 9.561*** 7.995*** 4.962*** 5.071*** 4.871***
Observations 514 514 514 443 443 443 452 452 452
Regulation Quality Rule of Law Voice and Accountability
Constant -0.204 -0.259 -0.180 -0.357 -0.415 -0.334 -0.693 -0.686 -0.706
(-0.278) (-0.343) (-0.249) (-0.447) (-0.508) (-0.427) (-1.142) (-1.122) (-1.173)
NODAgdp -0.030** --- --- -0.033** --- --- -0.008 --- ---
(-2.542) (-2.331) (-0.884)
NODAMDgdp --- -0.068** --- --- -0.074** --- --- -0.021 ---
(-2.412) (-2.203) (-0.915)
NODADACgdp --- --- -0.054*** --- --- -0.060** --- --- -0.014
(-2.594) (-2.385) (-0.845)
Democracy 0.115** 0.121*** 0.112** 0.139** 0.146*** 0.135** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.198***
(2.545) (2.644) (2.479) (2.561) (2.631) (2.531) (5.367) (5.457) (5.323)
Public Investment -0.053 -0.052 -0.053 -0.049 -0.048 -0.048 -0.057 -0.058 -0.055
(-0.590) (-0.558) (-0.600) (-0.520) (-0.493) (-0.528) (-0.822) (-0.829) (-0.811)
Hausman-test 48.153*** 44.185*** 54.739*** 81.226*** 79.312*** 89.942*** 46.888*** 44.846*** 42.808***
OIR-Sargan test 1.890 4.163** 0.612 2.559 5.310** 0.929 0.685 0.338 1.038
P-value [0.169] [0.041] [0.433] [0.109] [0.021] [0.335] [0.407] [0.560] [0.308]
Cragg-Donald --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Adjusted R² 0.206 0.208 0.191 0.217 0.209 0.211 0.564 0.565 0.562
Fisher Statistics 9.415*** 9.547*** 9.123*** 7.991*** 8.196*** 7.789*** 18.040*** 18.748*** 17.450***
Observations 450 450 450 452 452 452 452 452 452
First-Set of Instruments Constant; English ; Christianity; Middle  Income; Lower Middle Income 
Second-Set of Instruments Constant; French; Islam; Lower Income; Upper Middle Income
*;**;***:  significance  levels  of  10%,  5%  and  1%  respectively.  ():  z-statistics  .  []:  p-values  corresponding  to  OIR-Sargan  test.   OIR:  
Overidentifying Restrictions test.  NODAgdp:  NODA on GDP. NODAMDgdp:NODA from Multilateral Donors  on GDP.  NODADACgdp: 
NODA  from DAC  countries on GDP.  
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4.4 Further discussion, caveats, policy implications and limitations 
Findings in this paper do not provide much premise for the hope that Western aid can 
save Africa. Maybe current views on the roots of poverty in the continent are too simplistic and 
attempts to change these root causes have underestimated the difficulty of doing so from the 
outside. The failed attempt by the West to rescue Africa through aid does not necessarily imply a 
disastrous outlook for the continent. Africans on their own will have to achieve economic and 
political changes that promote economic development and some of these changes are already on 
course(such  as  the  movement  towards  freer  markets  and  the  expansion  of  democratic 
institutions). There are thus hopeful signs of enterprise growth in Africa. The mushrooming of 
cell phones for example has enabled Africa edge the phase of fixed phones in the development 
process. Economic development in the continent depends on African private sector entrepreneurs 
, African civic activists and African political reformers… not on what ineffective, bureaucratic, 
unaccountable,  poorly informed  and unmotivated outsiders do. 
So if anything, what should the West do for Africa? Just because the West cannot save 
the continent does not logically imply there is nothing the rich countries can do for the poor 
there-in.  The  evidence  in  the  literature(Easterly,  2005a)  suggests  that  aid  has  been  more 
successful  at  delivering  tangible  outcomes  like  health,  education  and  water.  The  micro 
development  literature  using randomized controlled  trails  also finds  positive  effects  of some 
specific development interventions from development assistance.  In summary, the West cannot 
save Africa, but foreign aid can still be beneficial to recipient countries in a piecemeal way to 
alleviate the sufferings of those desperately poor. 
More modest goals from assistance  in Africa would make it easier to hold aid agencies 
accountable  for  the  results  of  aid-targeted  projects.  The  sweeping  ambitions  of  the  current 
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Western aid efforts in Africa do not lend themselves to accountability, since for the most part the 
results are contingent  on many other factors beside aid agency efforts. Attempts to isolate the 
effects of these efforts have proved fruitless. More accountable agencies could  be encouraged to 
make greater strides on piecemeal  interventions.  These modest  goals would render the West 
much less intrusive in Africa, therefore ending the historical tendency towards ever-increasing 
escalation of Western interventions in the continent. This could be a positive prospect because 
the intrusive Western role has made African governments accountable to external actors instead 
of their own citizens. It follows that insiders(those within Africa) have better information and 
incentives to solve their own problems than outsiders do. Arguably, local democracy that eases 
citizen feedback have proven to be a more effective vehicle for government quality than outside 
pressure. On a final note,  the more intrusive large-scale interventions have many unintended 
consequences that are hard to evaluate, a great bulk of which could be detrimental. 
Maybe the success of action in society depends on more particular facts than anyone can 
possibly know. As Hayek(1988)  posited  “the curious task in economics is to demonstrate to  
men how little they know about what they imagine they can design”. The escalation of Western 
interventions in the African continent demonstrates an arrogance in the face of very imperfect 
knowledge. Once economists discard arrogance, there is hope to hold donors accountable for 
such piecemeal  outcomes  as  well-maintained  roads,  water  supply,  medicines,  textbooks  and 
nutritional  supplements  to  improve  the  well-being  of  the  poorest  people  in  the  world.  It  is 
therefore a  momentous time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid; it  is great time for 
economists and policy makers to start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is 
based. In the meantime, it is up to people who really care about the poor to hold aid agencies 
accountable for results.  
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An important limitation worth mentioning is that this kind of analysis depends to a great 
extent  on the  integrity  of the proxy for  GQ obtained from perception-based measures.  Thus 
omitted  variables  and  media-effect  could  significantly  affect  perceptions  of  GQ  and 
consequently  bias  the  link  between  the  aid  indicators  and  the  GQ  performance  measures. 
However, to the best of our knowledge there are no better  measures of GQ than those from 
African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The paper has limited this setback by using 
six different indicators of GQ. Also the employment of a methodology that takes endogeneity 
into account addresses concerns of omitted-variables and bias in the perception-based measures. 
5. Conclusion
For over five decades the political economy of foreign aid has been widely debated in 
academic and policy-making circles. A large literature on institutions and development suggests 
that Africa is poor because it has poor institutions: dictatorship, lack of property rights, weak 
courts  and  contract  enforcement,  high  corruption,  political  instability,  violence  and  hostile 
regulatory environment for private business. In assessing the impact of development assistance, a 
great  bulk  of  studies  have  focused  on  the  effect  of  aid  flows  on  GDP  growth  and  other 
macroeconomic variables(investment or public consumption). The underlying assumption here is 
that  aid  is  destined  to  bridge  the  saving-investment  gap  poor  countries  face(Rostow,1960; 
Chenery  &  Strout,1966;  Easterly,  2005a).  Surprisingly  there  has  been  much  less  research 
conducted on the impact of foreign aid on the evolution of government institutions.
This  paper  has  assessed  the  effectiveness  of  foreign  aid  in  improving  government 
institutions  in  52  African  countries  using  updated  data(1996-2010).  Findings  suggest 
development  assistance  deteriorates  government  quality  dynamics  of  corruption-control, 
political-stability,  rule  of  law,  regulation  quality,  voice  and  accountability  and  government 
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effectiveness. Maybe  the  success  of  action  in  society  depends on more  particular  facts  than 
anyone  can  possibly  know.  As  Hayek(1988)   posited  “the  curious  task  in  economics  is  to  
demonstrate  to  men  how  little  they  know  about  what  they  imagine  they  can  design”.  The 
escalation of Western interventions in the African continent demonstrates an arrogance in the 
face of very imperfect knowledge. Once economists  discard arrogance,  there is hope to hold 
donors  accountable  for  such  piecemeal  outcomes  as  well-maintained  roads,  water  supply, 
medicines,  textbooks  and  nutritional  supplements  to  improve  the  well-being  of  the  poorest 
people in the world. It is therefore a  momentous time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid;  
it is great time for economists and policy makers to start rethinking the models and theories on 
which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to people who really care about the poor to 
hold aid agencies accountable for results.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Development 
Assistance 
Net Development Assistance(NODA) 10.811 12.774 -0.251 148.30 704
NODA from Multilateral Donors   4.481 5.512 -1.985 64.097 704
NODA from DAC countries  6.244 8.072 -0.679 97.236 704
Government 
Quality 
Control of Corruption -0.603 0.628 -2.495 1.086 611
Government Effectiveness -0.665 0.606 -1.853 0.807 587
Political Stability -0.563 0.963 -3.311 1.143 624
Regulation Quality -0.673 0.673 -2.729 0.905 620
Rule of Law -0.700 0.686 -2.691 1.053 622
Voice and Accountability -0.678 0.739 -2.174 1.047 624
Control 
Variables
Population growth 2.359 1.015 -1.081 10.043 780
Trade 78.352 39.923 17.859 275.23 705
Democracy 2.307 4.089 -8.000 10.000 735
Public Investment 7.489 4.535 0.000 39.984 641
Instrumental 
Variables
English Common-Law 0.384 0.486 0.000 1.000 780
French Civil-Law 0.615 0.486 0.000 1.000 780
Christianity 0.634 0.481 0.000 1.000 780
Islam 0.365 0.481 0.000 1.000 780
Low Income 0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 780
Middle Income 0.423 0.494 0.000 1.000 780
Lower Middle Income 0.230 0.421 0.000 1.000 780
Upper Middle Income 0.192 0.394 0.000 1.000 780
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis
Quality of Government Dev. Assistance Control Variables Instrumental Variables
CC Gov.E PolS R.Q R.L V&A TA MLD DAC Popg Trade Demo PubI Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI
1.000 0.846 0.691 0.733 0.871 0.668 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.28 0.157 0.491 0.212 0.118 -0.11 0.133 -0.13 -0.32 0.322 0.071 0.327 CC
1.000 0.659 0.806 0.890 0.703 -0.27 -0.25 -0.24 -0.36 0.115 0.459 0.123 0.293 -0.29 0.057 -0.05 -0.42 0.424 0.156 0.361 Gov.E
1.000 0.643 0.802 0.661 -0.14 -0.12 -0.14 -0.22 0.312 0.528 0.252 0.060 -0.06 0.171 -0.17 -0.26 0.266 -0.03 0.367 PolS
1.000 0.816 0.715 -0.24 -0.22 -0.23 -0.19 -0.00 0.519 0.078 0.134 -0.13 0.077 -0.07 -0.27 0.274 0.106 0.231 R.Q
1.000 0.728 -0.20 -0.17 -0.20 -0.29 0.173 0.536 0.224 0.164 -0.16 0.115 -0.11 -0.35 0.357 0.084 0.359 R.L
1.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.002 -0.15 0.041 0.755 0.025 0.255 -0.25 0.226 -0.22 -0.15 0.152 -0.08 0.279 V&A
1.000 0.900 0.955 0.368 -0.10 -0.03 0.195 -0.05 0.050 0.058 -0.05 0.450 -0.45 -0.26 -0.28 TA
1.000 0.733 0.400 -0.09 0.011 0.220 -0.03 0.035 -0.00 0.006 0.475 -0.47 -0.28 -0.29 MLD
1.000 0.304 -0.09 -0.05 0.141 -0.05 0.056 0.098 -0.09 0.382 -0.38 -0.22 -0.24 DAC
1.000 -0.25 -0.06 0.043 -0.10 0.107 0.008 -0.00 0.425 -0.42 -0.22 -0.29 Popg
1.000 0.016 0.175 0.176 -0.17 0.181 -0.18 -0.35 0.35 0.137 0.294 Trade
1.000 0.147 0.177 -0.17 0.163 -0.16 -0.03 0.034 -0.16 0.228 Demo
1.000 -0.13 0.138 0.008 -0.00 -0.04 0.049 0.002 0.059 PubI
1.000 -1.00 0.189 -0.18 -0.04 0.043 -0.05 0.115 Eng.
1.000 -0.18 0.189 0.043 -0.04 0.057 -0.11 Frch.
1.000 -1.00 -0.00 0.003 -0.15 0.167 Chris
1.000 0.003 -0.00 0.153 -0.16 Islam
1.000 -1.00 -0.63 -0.56 LI
1.000 0.639 0.569 MI
1.000 -0.26 LMI
1.000 UMI
CC: Control of Corruption.  Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. PolS: Political Stability or No Violence. R.Q: Regulation Quality. R.L: Rule of Law.  V& A: Voice and Accountability. TA: Total  development  
assistance.  MLD: Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  Popg: Population growth. Demo: Democracy.  PubI:Public Investment.   Eng: English  
Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: Low Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Sources
Net Development Assistance(NODA) NODAgdp NODA(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
NODA from Multilateral Donors NODAMDgdp NODAMDgdp(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
NODA from DAC Countries NODADACgdp NODADACgdp(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Government Effectiveness Gov. E Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Political Stability/ No Violence PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Trade(Openness) Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Democracy Demo Level of Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Public Investment  PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  DAC: Development Assistance Committee. 
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Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num.
Legal-origins 
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles,  Sierra Leone, 
Somalia,  South  Africa,  Sudan,  Swaziland,   Uganda,  Zambia, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
20
French Civil-Law  Algeria,  Angola,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon, 
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Republic, 
Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti,  Egypt,  Eritrea, 
Equatorial  Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  Ethiopia,  Gabon,  Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya,  Madagascar,  Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe,  Senegal, 
Togo, Tunisia.
32
Religions Christianity 
Angola,  Benin  ,Botswana,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde, 
Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Congo  Democratic 
Republic,  Ivory  Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Eritrea, 
Gabon,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi, 
Mauritius,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Rwanda,  Seychelles,  Sao 
Tome  &  Principe,  South  Africa,  Swaziland,  Togo,  Uganda, 
Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
33
Islam Algeria,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Djibouti,  The  Gambia,  Egypt, 
Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea,  Libya,   Mali,  Mauritania,  Morocco, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia.
19
Income Levels
Low Income Benin ,Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo  Republic,  Congo   Democratic  Republic,  Djibouti, 
Ethiopia,  Eritrea,  The Gambia,  Ghana,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guinea, 
Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,   Mali,  Mauritania, 
Mozambique,  Niger,  Rwanda,   Sierra  Leone,  Somalia,  Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe.
30
Middle Income Algeria,  Angola  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Egypt, 
Ivory  Coast,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Gabon,  Lesotho,  Libya, 
Mauritius,  Morocco,  Namibia,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  Seychelles, 
Sao Tome & Principe, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
22
Lower Middle Income Angola,  Cameroon,  Cape Verde,  Egypt,  Ivory Coast,  Lesotho, 
Morocco,  Nigeria, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
11
Upper Middle Income Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya,  Mauritius, 
Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa. 
10
Num: number of countries 
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